

# The Congressional Black Caucus and Vote Cohesion: Placing the Caucus Within House Voting Patterns

NEIL PINNEY, WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY  
GEORGE SERRA, BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

Roll-call votes of African American representatives are explored to discern more explicitly the ideological cohesiveness of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and factors that affect vote choice. We use adjusted Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores. The adjustment corrects for changes in the ADA's scale from year to year. The analysis is carried out focusing on CBC coherence with respect to ideological voting and potential influences on Caucus unity. We pool the CBC data from the period under investigation (1971-1996) to address the impact of variables identified as affecting roll call voting. The findings suggest that while there is considerably more diversity within the CBC than we sometimes imagine, African American representatives are more cohesive with the Black Caucus on roll call behavior than they are with either their regional or state party delegations. In addition, analyses suggest that seniority, correspondence between the president's party and the CBC, presidential policy preferences, percent black voters in the district, and electoral margin of victory in the district may help explain variation in Caucus unity. Finally, we conclude high vote cohesion is meaningful for the CBC and the representation of black interests in Congress.

Cohesion is an important and often analyzed aspect of legislative voting. Congressional scholars have shown that unity in roll-call voting enhances the impact of legislative groups to bargain within the policymaking process, and more importantly, permits them to negotiate effectively with other blocs in the House of Representatives (Ferber 1971; Sinclair 1982; Stevens, Miller, and Mann

---

NOTE: The authors are listed alphabetically. This project was supported by Bridgewater State College's Center for Legislative Studies and Center for the Advancement of Research and Teaching.

*Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (September 1999): pp. 583-608

1974). The most frequent target of cohesion studies is the party as a whole or regional components of the party (e.g., Deckard 1972; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Fleisher 1993; Patterson and Calderia 1988; Rhode 1989, 1991; Sinclair 1982). It may be quite illuminating, however, to explain cohesion in other contexts. In particular, it would be useful to explore the proliferating informal caucuses in Congress (Davidson and Oleszek 1990; Hammond 1989; Ferber 1971; Groennings 1973; Loomis 1981). One of the oldest and most familiar of these caucuses is the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). We will focus on the CBC as an initial exploration of this growing feature of the congressional landscape.<sup>1</sup>

The proliferation of voluntary associations is largely a post-1970 phenomenon (Hammond, Stevens, Mulhollan 1983), with groups formally organizing around a myriad of coalescing bonds that include party concerns, economic interests, regional interests, and national constituencies (Davidson and Oleszek 1990; Loomis 1981). Groups generally form because members have perceived the existence of "biases in the institution's structure of collective decision-making and have acted to counter those biases" (Loomis 1981: 206). The performance of this critical task is aided when congressional caucuses vote as a cohesive bloc. Bloc voting produces impact; it enhances the political stature and bargaining leverage of groups, allowing them to win concessions on public policy issues of concern to members and their constituents (Giles and Jones 1995; Wolman and Thomas 1970).

Group solidarity is generally attributed to the functions and services caucuses perform for their memberships. Functions include providing a psychological support system (Groennings 1973), and an enhanced communication network that disseminates trustworthy information and cues for making voting decisions (Fiellin 1962; Kingdon 1989). Services include enhancing research capabilities of the group's membership (Ferber 1971), and promoting their institutional integration (Canon 1995; Champagne and Rieselbach 1995). The significance of these functions and services is that they increase the sense of camaraderie among like-minded caucus members and enhance group cohesion (Giles and Jones 1995: 624).

From the studies that have touched on the topic of congressional caucuses, there is certainly ample reason to suspect that the CBC's membership has successfully maximized the provision of these functions and services. Common reference to the Black Caucus as a hardy band of outsiders united against the importunings of the status quo has led political observers on both sides of the political spectrum to view this racially based legislative group as single-minded when the roll is called. As the self-described conscience of Congress, the CBC has been

---

<sup>1</sup> Substantial gaps exist in our understanding of the CBC's legislative behavior in part because few academic studies focus on roll-call voting among black legislators, and in part because these studies, with notable exceptions (Champagne and Rieselbach 1995; Canon 1995; Giles and Jones 1995; Singh 1998; Swain 1993), tend to be relatively dated, based on specific Congresses (Henry 1977; Levy and Stoudinger 1976, 1978), or historical analyses (Baker and McCorry 1976; Barnett 1975).

among the most ardent congressional supporters of liberal policies. Given that African American public opinion is often substantially more liberal on economic and social issues than that of white Americans (Lublin 1997: chap. 5), we might plausibly speculate that unified roll-call behavior among the CBC's membership enhances black substantive representation in Congress.<sup>2</sup>

Our study focuses on determining whether one can indeed find indications that black representatives vote as a cohesive unit. More specifically, our research examines the ideological cohesion among African American representatives from the CBC's formal inception in 1971 through 1996. The study seeks to determine how coherent the Caucus's membership is with respect to ideological voting behavior and whether the CBC is more cohesive than overlapping groups. We then move on to consider potential influences on CBC cohesion and whether they serve to undermine the possibility of harmonious relations among African Americans in Congress.

#### MEASURING GROUP COHESIVENESS

For all its use, the measurement of group cohesion cannot be entirely satisfying to thoughtful students of the subject. One problem endemic in the party voting literature is the confusion that may arise over two distinct meanings of the term "group cohesion." On the one hand, the term may refer to consistency or similarity of legislators' voting records arising from various factors, including functions and services caucuses perform for their memberships. On the other hand, it may also describe the situation in which group leaders are able to induce their members to vote as the leadership directs (see Krehbiel 1993 for a discussion of alternative meanings of the term). We are ultimately interested in the level of cohesion and in its influence payoff, not in the ability of group leaders to "whip" members. Since we are not interested in leadership influence per se, the first conceptualization is preferable. For our purposes, groups displaying homogeneity in their voting are cohesive regardless of the underlying explanation for the cohesion.

Apart from the conceptual fog surrounding the term "group cohesion," a further difficulty is that the typical cohesion analysis hinges on determining the frequency of individual agreement with the voting behavior of a particular reference group. Agreement occurs when a member votes the same way as a majority (or some other arbitrary cutoff point) of the group. This measure has been used in studying legislative behavior for many decades, but no one would argue that it is flawless or that it exhausts the possibilities of tapping "group cohesion" (Cox and

---

<sup>2</sup> Although a study of descriptive versus substantive representation is central to the nature of black representation in Congress, this study underestimates the controversies that stem from the types of representation theorists identify. For example, does race automatically translate into substantive representation? Is descriptive representation a necessary or sufficient criterion for substantive representation? While these theoretical questions are beyond the scope of this paper, showing how the CBC operates can contribute a great deal on this debate.

McCubbins 1993). We cannot automatically conclude that for any given roll-call vote agreement between a representative and a reference group establishes the reference group as an accepted voting cue. Agreement may be the result of parallelism of interest, coincidence, or other factors (Levy and Stouder 1976: 33). We look at the Congressional Black Caucus as a potentially cohesive organization. Obviously, we cannot readily observe all factors influencing African American representatives' votes on a systematic basis. As Kingdon and others have argued there are any number of factors that will impinge on the degree of unity enjoyed by congressional groups (Kingdon 1989: 120-23). Constituency differences, candidate recruitment, partisan communication patterns within Congress, reactions to administration positions, and the like may all have an impact on group cohesion. We can observe, however, a product of the legislative environment in which members of the CBC operate—ideological differences among African American legislators, differences likely to wax and wane over time. This perspective on legislative behavior leads us to measure the CBC's unity by the extent to which its members cluster around their respective ideological center of gravity.

With a measure that will permit us to evaluate the ideological dispersion within the CBC, we can track the extent to which it presents a relatively cohesive image to the outside world. In other words, we can go beyond simple unity scores that tap cohesion exclusively to say how coherent the CBC's membership is with respect to ideology. We can examine that as well as the extent to which traditional factors identified as influencing roll-call voting behavior and party voting patterns have affected the ideological coherence of the Black Caucus. To what degree do CBC members vote in tandem with regional and state party delegations? To what extent is CBC cohesion distinctive from party voting patterns? To what degree do constituency differences, electoral margin of victory, seniority, correspondence between the President's party and CBC, and presidential policy preferences challenge CBC cohesion?

There are various measures of member ideology that could be used, but the liberalism ratings of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) are probably the best. ADA ratings are frequently used in the academic community as a reliable indicator of liberal voting in Congress (Fleisher 1993; Stimson, MacKuen, Erikson 1994, 1995; Scholz and Wei 1986; Weingast and Moran 1983). Furthermore, the ratings have been found to correlate quite highly with other well-known rating systems over time (e.g., Americans for Constitutional Action, American Conservative Union, and AFL-CIO Committee of Political Education) (Kau and Rubin 1982; Poole 1981; Poole and Rosenthal 1985).<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> The ratings represent the proportion of "correct" votes (from the viewpoint of the organization) compared with the total number of salient roll-calls chosen by the ADA, typically about twenty votes per year. Liberal-conservative dimensions used by interest groups to construct their ratings emphasize the same evaluative dimension and are in close agreement on placing legislators along

Nonetheless, interest group ratings like the ADAs have been criticized on various grounds. One concern is that they may tend to exaggerate the degree of extremism in Congress (Snyder 1992). In countering this point, Krehbiel (1994) notes that any bias in these scores is small, and the odds that their use will lead to faulty inferences is also small. Another potential difficulty arises from comparing ADA (and other interest group ratings) over time since member scores are based on different sets of issues every year. Hence, the scales may shift or stretch from one year to the next. Similarly, if one is interested in making contemporaneous comparisons, the same shift/stretching issue arises since the set of issues comprising groups scales will be different.

Fortunately, recent work by Groseclose et al. (1995) provides a convenient solution to the problem of temporal comparisons. The authors generate an index transforming raw ADA scores into adjusted ADA ones in which scale changes are taken into account. In the same way that economists take a baseline year to use as a benchmark for price changes, Groseclose et al. take the 1980 House as the standard against which to measure changes in the ADA scale. Drawing on the 24,753 ADA scores generated from the 80th Congress through the 103rd Congress, the authors use maximum likelihood techniques to generate the estimated shift and stretch parameters annually. This in turn allows them to generate adjusted ADA scores that can be compared over time. We make use of adjusted ADA scores in the analysis that follows.<sup>4</sup>

#### DATA AND ANALYSIS

We create a data set with all ADA scores for voting House members from the 92nd Congress through the 104th Congress (1971-96). We also collect informa-

---

this dimension. Poole (1981: 56) demonstrates that the overall fit statistic (i.e., mean squared Pearson correlation coefficients) between actual interest group ratings and ratings predicted by unfolding analysis (a technique for determining the underlying structure of preferential data) are .913 (Americans for Democratic Action), .872 (AFL-CIO Committee of Political Education), .936 (American Conservative Union), and .937 (Americans for Constitutional Action). Nonetheless, to provide a multiple test of key hypotheses we also used AFL-CIO Committee of Political Education (i.e., COPE) scores as an alternative dependent variable in our analyses of CBC cohesion from 1971-96. The results were of the same magnitude and direction (results not reported) as results of analyses using ADA scores.

<sup>4</sup> Floor votes chosen by the ADA include social, economic, and foreign policy issues; many of these votes (e.g., fair housing, civil rights restoration, Medicare caps, trade with South Africa, and requiring the federal government to collect and publish data on crimes committed against individuals on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual preference) are directly relevant to African American interests. Almost all public policy issues, however, either directly or indirectly have some impact on black constituents and the black community as a whole. With finite budget resources, every allocative decision acquires relevance for the representation of black interests in Congress (Levy and Stoudinger 1976: 42). Moreover, it is wrong-headed to assume that African American interests are only directly affected by, and that African Americans only have concerns about, issues that have an explicit black stake.

tion about representatives' partisanship, membership in regional and state party delegations, district composition (i.e., percent urban population in the district and percent African American voters in the district), margin of victory in the district, seniority, and vote agreement with Presidents' declared policy positions. For the analyses undertaken in the present paper, scores for the ADA index are based on votes where the member was present and voting.<sup>5</sup>

#### *Black Caucus Cohesiveness*

A simple measure of cohesion is the standard deviation of observations from the group mean. Calculating the standard deviation of Black Caucus adjusted ADA scores gives an intuitively appealing measure of ideological dispersion within the CBC.<sup>6</sup> In particular, this measure estimates the typical deviation of African American representatives from the CBC as a group. Table 1 displays average yearly adjusted ADA scores, dispersion scores (standard deviations), and minimum and maximum adjusted ADA values over time.

The most obvious feature here is that while the Black Caucus has considerable communality of interest it is not monolithic. CBC members tend to score at the higher end of the adjusted ADA scale, but there is considerable variation among members' ratings. From 1971-96 the Caucus's average yearly adjusted ADA score is 88.1; its highest average yearly adjusted ADA score is 92.9 in 1991 while its lowest score is 78.5 in 1982. The Black Caucus's ideological bent,

---

<sup>5</sup> ADA scores are corrected for absences. The voting House membership of the Black Caucus from 1971-96 included the following representatives: Sanford Bishop (D-GA), Lucien Blackwell (D-PA), Corrine Brown (D-FL), Yvonne Burke (D-CA), Shirley Chisholm (D-NY), William Clay (D-MO), Eva Clayton (D-NC), Jim Clyburn (D-SC), Barbara Collins (D-MI), Cardiss Collins (D-IL), George Collins (D-IL), John Conyers (D-MI), George Crockett (D-MN), Danny Davis (D-IL), Ronald Dellums (D-CA), Charles Diggs (D-MI), Julian Dixon (D-CA), Mervyn Dymally (D-CA), Mike Espy (D-MS), Chaka Fattah (D-PA), Cleo Fields (D-LA), Floyd Flake (D-NY), Harold Ford (D-TN), Gary Franks (R-CT), William Gray (D-PA), Katie Hall (D-IN), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), Augustus Hawkins (D-CA), Julia Carson (D-IN), Charles Hayes (D-IL), Earl Hilliard (D-AL), Jesse Jackson, Jr. (D-IL), Shelia Jackson-Lee (D-TX), William Jefferson (D-LA), Eddie Johnson (D-TX), Barbara Jordon (D-TX), Carolyn Kilpatrick (D-MI), Mickey Leland (D-TX), John Lewis (D-GA), Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), Carrie Meek (D-FL), Ralph Metcalfe (D-IL), Kweisi Mfume (D-MD), Parren Mitchell (D-MD), Robert Nix (D-PA), Major Owens (D-NY), Donald Payne (D-NJ), Charles Rangel (D-NY), Mel Reynolds (D-IL), Bobby Rush (D-IL), Gus Savage (D-IL), Bobby Scott (D-VA), Bennett Stewart (D-IL), Louis Stokes (D-OH), Walter Tucker (D-CA), Bennie Thompson (D-MS), Edolphus Towns (D-NY), Alton Waldon (D-NY), Craig Washington (D-TX), Harold Washington (D-IL), Maxine Waters (D-CA), Mel Watt (D-NC), J.C. Watts (R-OK), Alan Wheat (D-MD), Albert Wynn (D-MD), and Andrew Young (D-GA).

<sup>6</sup> Representative Gary Franks (R-CT) and Representative J. C. Watts (R-OK) are excluded from analyses. The decision on whether to use Representative Franks and Representative Watts in the data set presents an interesting dilemma. On the one hand, excluding them would underestimate the diversity within the Caucus. On the other hand, including Franks and Watts may contaminate the estimates since it is difficult to disentangle the effect of partisanship on dispersion scores from the effect of the variables of interest. Representative Franks' and Representative Watts' (relatively conservative)

though mostly liberal, ranges from the progressive politics of California Democrats Maxine Waters and Ron Dellums to the more programmatic moderation of William Jefferson (D-LA) and Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX).

Furthermore, the dispersion data for the Black Caucus shows considerable diversity among African American representatives, both across years in terms of where members cluster in their ideological voting and in terms of variation within years. For example, in 1972, 1983, and 1987 the Caucus is relatively cohesive with dispersion scores averaging around 7 points on the adjusted ADA scale. In contrast, in 1971, 1974, 1977, and 1978 dispersion scores average around 19 points on the adjusted ADA scale. The low level of agreement exhibited by black legislators in these years coincides with the CBC's oscillation over its proper role (Barnett 1975; Singh 1998) and splits within the Caucus over votes such as bans on busing for desegregation purposes and federal poverty programs. The inescapable conclusion is that our casual image of a hardy band of united outsiders needs readjustment. There is considerably more diversity within the Black Caucus than we sometimes imagine.

#### *Ideological Coherence of Reference Groups*

We now explore the ideological disparity among African American representatives and their fellow partisans from the same region and state and whether these traditional reference groups may have affected the coherence of the Caucus. Of potential applicability is Kingdon's argument that regional and state party delegations may serve as a useful cue for information-seeking legislators, since party members from the same geographical area may be more familiar and their judgments more trustworthy than those of "outsiders" (Kingdon 1989: 85-88; see also Deckard 1972 and Sinclair 1982 for a fuller exploration of this topic). In addition, state party delegation and, in particular, the "dean" of the delegation may wield influence over legislators' committee assignments and facilitate reelection efforts, thus effecting career patterns within the chamber (Masters 1961;

ADA scores significantly deviate from the group and thus have a substantial impact on the variance of the group, increasing Caucus dispersion (1991-96) by an average of 85.8 percent.

Black Caucus Dispersion

Year	Without Representative Franks and Representative Watts	With Representative Franks and Representative Watts	Percent Increase
1991	9.10	18.00	
1992	11.27	17.87	97.68
1993	7.84	15.21	58.63
1994	10.17	15.10	97.08
1995	7.90	18.57	48.46
1996	10.00	20.83	135.26
			108.21

≡ TABLE 1  
 IDEOLOGICAL COHERENCE OF BLACK CAUCUS<sup>a</sup>

Year	Mean Adjusted ADA Score	Standard Deviation	Maximum Score	Minimum Score
1971	78.9	18.5	99.3	43.9
1972	88.5	6.6	94.0	75.6
1973	86.0	10.0	95.6	69.2
1974	85.9	16.9	106.1	52.8
1975	87.5	8.3	97.4	77.8
1976	87.5	13.2	109.8	68.3
1977	88.1	14.5	107.7	64.2
1978	91.9	25.6	128.9	50.9
1979	88.7	11.8	105.5	77.9
1980	83.9	9.1	100.0	72.0
1981	86.3	14.1	100.9	59.4
1982	78.5	8.5	90.5	65.2
1983	85.0	7.0	95.2	70.9
1984	89.9	7.9	99.6	74.3
1985	91.3	8.9	102.2	76.1
1986	90.9	7.6	98.2	73.6
1987	85.9	7.4	93.5	93.5
1988	84.8	7.5	94.6	37.6
1989	87.7	11.7	94.6	37.6
1990	89.1	10.3	98.3	58.8
1991	92.9	8.9	101.9	66.7
1992	83.6	11.0	90.6	39.0
1993	89.9	7.7	97.0	72.7
1994	91.0	10.2	101.6	56.5 <sup>b</sup>
1995	89.4	7.9	96.9	62.6
1996	88.7	10.0	100.9	61.0
Average	88.1	10.8	100.0	63.8

<sup>a</sup> Scores listed in Table 1 are adjusted ADA scores with 1980 serving as the baseline year (see Groseclose et al. 1995).

Clapp 1963: 183-212; Levey and Stoudinger 1976: 31). This suggests that CBC members may rely on more traditional reference sources rather than the Caucus for primary vote cues.

Exploring African American legislators' coherence with traditional reference groups can be accomplished straightforwardly with the adjusted ADA data set. We are able to examine the difference for a given year between the dispersion of African American representatives from the CBC as a group in comparison with the typical deviation of CBC members from the mean adjusted ADA score of their regional party groupings and state party delegation.<sup>7</sup> We should note that the dis-

<sup>7</sup> The regions are the four regions defined by *Congressional Quarterly*, *Gallup*, and *New York Times/CBC News Poll* among others—East (Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts,

persion score for each reference group is based on the typical deviation of an African American representative from the ideological mean of that group. Hence we are able to examine the internal cohesion among African American representatives and each of the reference groups. Figure 1 displays dispersion scores (standard deviations) over time. Higher values indicate greater dispersion (i.e., less ideological cohesion); lower values indicate greater ideological unity. As the key indicates, the filled-in boxes track CBC members' vote cohesion; the hollow diamonds track CBC members' vote cohesion with their state party delegation; and the filled-in triangles track CBC members' vote cohesion with their regional party delegation.

The results presented by the figure indicate that although there is substantial agreement among African American representatives' votes and the votes of their regional and state party delegations, differences become more apparent over time. For example, in 1971 there was a 5 percent difference between the three groups. However, this difference grew to over 56 percent in 1990. The overall pattern of the cohesion data reveals a CBC membership that is more ideologically united but less cohesive with its regional party and state party counterparts in the latter part of the time series (1982 through 1996) than in the earlier part of the data set (1971 through 1981). Findings suggest that black representatives over time appear to rely more on voting cues from the Black Caucus than either regional or state party delegations. To be sure, these reference groups remain an important vote cue for black legislators. However, as the CBC has matured in its role as an institutionalized player (Canon 1995), traditional vote cues have become less important.<sup>8</sup>


The pattern of limited CBC vote cohesion during the first decade under study and high cohesion after 1982 coincides with the Caucus's shift away from

---

Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, West Virginia), Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota), South (Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia; Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas), and West (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington). (See Stanely and Niemi 1994: 440, Table A-2.)

<sup>8</sup> To provide a combined test for the independence of reference group means while controlling for the impact of time, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated. We would expect the ANOVA to produce a significant value of  $F$  if the mean values of dispersion scores for reference groups are not all equal. It does,  $F(2,75) = 5.79$ ,  $p < .01$ . We do not know, however, which means are statistically different from which other means. The analysis of variance does not allow us to examine differences among individual groups for the purpose of making comparisons (or contrasts) among them (Howell 1982). The estimated differences in populations produced by the ANOVA can be used in the calculation of a Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) multiple range test, one of many techniques for making comparisons among means (Howell 1982). The analysis indicates that African American legislators are indeed significantly,  $p < .05$ , more cohesive with the CBC as a group (mean = 10.86) than they are with their state party delegations (mean = 15.47) or with their regional party delegations (mean = 15.26).

≡ FIGURE 1  
LEGISLATORS' COHESION WITH THE CBC AND REGIONAL REFERENCE GROUPS  
(Typical Deviation of Black Legislators from CBC, State, and Regional Party Delegations)




extra-legislative activities (i.e., operating largely outside the power structure of the House) toward a strategy of "inside" politics (i.e., promoting their political agenda in Congress) (Champagne and Rieselbach 1995; Canon 1995). By the early 1980s, the CBC worked to raise black issues and place them on the congressional agenda; conducted research on these matters, and disseminated the information to members and nonmembers. CBC pooled its collective resources, often collaborating with external interest groups, in order to build coalitions around programs it favored (Champagne and Rieselbach 1995: 151). In short, it resembled other informal legislative caucuses. This evolution was likely facilitated, in no small part, by the CBC's increased membership, ordinary congressional attrition rates, black legislators' electoral safety, and their increased legislative experience and positions of influence.

#### *Ideological Coherence and Party Voting Patterns*

We must consider a potentially confounding factor before we can conclude that the CBC serves as an important cue-giver for black members of the House. That complication arises from the overall upturn in party voting in Congress, that is the increase in consistency or similarity of legislators' voting records (Rhode 1989, 1991; Patterson and Calderia 1988; Cox and McCubbins 1993). We should check to see whether there are differences between CBC members' votes and party voting patterns in the House that could partly or wholly explain the pattern of increased ideological cohesion among African American representatives.

We can readily determine whether there are in fact complicating partisan patterns. Figure 2 displays the dispersion scores (standard deviations) of Black Caucus members, non-CBC Democrats, and Republicans over time. Higher values indicate a greater degree of dispersion; lower values indicate greater ideological cohesion. As the key indicates, the filled-in boxes track CBC data while the hollow diamonds and filled-in triangles track data for non-CBC Democrats and Republicans, respectively. Each observation represents the difference for a given year between the dispersion within the Black Caucus in comparison with the dispersion within non-CBC Democrats and Republicans (i.e., standard deviation of non-CBC Democrats and the standard deviation of Republicans). From 1971 onward the obvious trend in House non-CBC Democrats' voting over the past twenty years is one of decreased dispersion (greater ideological unity). By 1988 the dispersion score had fallen to 20.6, though it rose again in the early 1990s. The standard deviation for House Republicans is clustered around 18.6 ADA points. There is a modest increase in dispersion scores in the early 1970s but the overall pattern is essentially flat, with dispersion averaging in the mid-20s on the adjusted ADA scale. In short, the Democratic party becomes less divided internally on ideology and the Republican party maintains its cohesion over time (see Cover, Pinney, and Serra 1997 for a fuller discussion of this topic).

≡ FIGURE 2  
IDEOLOGICAL COHERENCE AND PARTY VOTING PATTERNS  
(Typical Deviation of CBC Members, Non-CBC Democrats and Republicans)



The level of CBC cohesion is noticeably different from the pattern for non-CBC Democrats and Republicans. The standard deviation for the Black Caucus is clustered around 11 ADA points. In 1974 and 1978 the standard deviation rose to 17 and 26 respectively but the overall pattern since 1978 is essentially one of increased coherence with dispersion averaging 9.3 on the adjusted ADA scale. Members of the Black Caucus tend to be nearly 42 percent more cohesive than Republicans and 58 percent more cohesive than non-CBC Democrats. Thus while both CBC and party voting patterns become less dispersed overall, there is more to increased CBC cohesion than growth in partisanship.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Cohesion within Regional Factions*

We can go further and examine cohesion scores within regional party coalitions to compare against scores for the Black Caucus. The noteworthy difference between cohesion scores of CBC members and non-CBC Democrats discussed above might be driven largely by the ideological gap between (relatively conservative) Southern Democrats and the rest of the party. In comparing CBC cohesiveness with regional party coalitions, we need only pursue factions within the Democratic party since Democrats overwhelming comprise the CBC's membership.





Figure 3 plots the dispersion scores of Black Caucus members and regional dispersion patterns for non-CBC Democrats. Higher values indicate a greater degree of dispersion; lower values indicate greater ideological unity. As the key indicates, the filled-in boxes track the Black Caucus, the hollow boxes track non-CBC Midwestern Democrats, the hollow diamonds track non-CBC Western Democrats, the hollow triangles track non-CBC Southern Democrats, and the hollow circles track non-CBC Eastern Democrats. Outside of some minor and insubstantial gaps between the East, Midwest, and West, the cohesion of these regional groupings within the House Democratic coalition are tightly clustered. It is very hard to disentangle much difference among the lot of them.

Cohesion in the South, in contrast, remains decidedly more dispersed than for any other wing of the House Democrats. With the notable exception of the Nixon Presidency when Southerners in the House were more unified than were other Democrats, white Southern Democrats have typically been less unified as a group than have other Democrats. The fact that this faction shows greater diversity than the bulk of the party is at least initially perplexing. The rationale for this,

---

<sup>9</sup> To discern more explicitly the effects of partisanship on cohesion scores a repeated measures ANOVA and a SNK test are used to detect significant differences among voting patterns of CBC members, non-CBC Democrats, and Republicans. Significant ANOVA results indicate that the mean values of dispersion scores for reference groups are not at all equal,  $F(2,75) = 89.50, p < .01$ . We use the information provided by the ANOVA in the SNK test to examine differences among individual groups for the purpose of making comparisons among them. The analysis indicates that CBC members are indeed significantly,  $p < .05$ , more cohesive as a group (mean = 10.86) than either non-CBC Democrats (mean = 26.19) or Republicans (mean = 18.61).

≡ FIGURE 3  
COHERENCE AND NON-CBC REGIONAL PATTERNS



however, flows quite nicely from Rhode's (1991: 42-47, 124-32) analysis of the "postreform House." The declining role played by Southern Democrats as an outlier group within the Democratic party, the growing heterogeneity of districts, and to some extent the "vote-buying" or "favor-trading" efforts of party leaders have contributed to this diversity (see Snyder 1991, Groseclose et al. 1995, and Krehbiel 1995 for further discussions of "vote-buying" or "favor-trading").<sup>10</sup>

From our perspective, the more important finding presented in Figure 3 is that the Congressional Black Caucus is substantially more cohesive as a group than any regional wing of the House Democrats, with the exception of 1978 when black legislators had considerable differences over legislative tactics regarding bills such as the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment act. Over the last twenty-six years, the Black Caucus is typically 41 percent less dispersed than Midwestern Democrats; 37 percent less dispersed than Western Democrats; 51 percent less dispersed than Southern Democrats; and 47 percent less dispersed than Eastern Democrats.<sup>11</sup>

#### *Cohesion within the CBC and Sources of Variation*

Up to this point, we have discussed the ideological coherence of the Black Caucus, the degree to which CBC members vote in tandem with their regional and state party delegations, and the extent to which Caucus cohesion is distinctive from the overall increases in homogeneity in both the Republican and Democratic parties in the House. Having established that there is variation in CBC cohesion, we might profitably focus here on what the sources of variation might be.

Previous research suggests that seniority may serve as a guide to roll-call decisions. It intimates experience (i.e., understanding and familiarity with both substantive and procedural issues). Senior legislators thus may be less dependent on organized reference groups for voting cues than their more junior counterparts, who have not yet established a network of informal contacts within the chamber (Levy and Stoudinger 1976: 39; Kingdon 1989). Moreover, institutional responsibilities associated with seniority in the House, such as committee chairmanships, may temper African American representatives' support for CBC initiatives (Harris 1994: 6-10; Swain 1993: 40; Champagne and Rieselbach 1995).

---

<sup>10</sup> We will not stop here to dwell on the impact of the Voting Rights Act, the development of a viable Republican party in much of the South, the greater sway of blacks among southern Democrats, and other well-known aspects of political change in the South (Bass and DeVries 1977; Black and Black 1987; Fleisher 1993).

<sup>11</sup> A repeated measures ANOVA and SNK test are calculated to examine more closely differences between CBC unity and regional Democratic party patterns of cohesion. The ANOVA produced significant results,  $F(4,125) = 26.13$ ,  $p < .01$ . When we use the estimated differences in populations produced by the ANOVA in an SNK test, the analysis indicates that CBC members are indeed significantly,  $p < .05$ , more cohesive as a group (mean = 10.86) than are Western non-CBC Democrats (mean = 17.15), Midwestern non-CBC Democrats (mean = 18.52), Eastern non-CBC Democrats (mean = 20.25), and Southern non-CBC Democrats (mean = 22.12).

Representative Gus Savage (D-IL) succinctly makes the point: "black committee chairmen don't act mainly as blacks, because the more dependent you are on white support for your position, generally speaking, the less black you can act" (cited in Harris 1994: 8).

Another possible source of influence on votes is correspondence between the President's party and the Black Caucus. When the President's party and the CBC are the same, black legislators may be presented with the dilemma of whether to take up the President's agenda (Canon 1995), undercutting Caucus unity. Representatives from the President's party in Congress have a stake in the administration's success (Kingdon 1989: 177-81). Republican Presidents, however, have no such claim on CBC members. In fact, opposition party members may unite around shared responsibilities of governance on interests salient to constituents (Neustadt 1980). Thus CBC members ought to be relatively more cohesive under Republican administrations than Democratic Presidents.

Despite the overall level of support CBC members show for Democratic Presidents, when forced to choose between party and the CBC, African American legislators will vote against the party (Canon 1995). Thus presidential policy preferences will also impact CBC cohesion. Individual legislator's agreement with the President's declared policy positions are expected to be positively associated with cohesion within the Black Caucus.

To ensure that the impact of seniority and party of the President are not merely capturing the effects of important excluded variables, additional theoretically important predictors of legislative behavior are introduced into the study. We control for the effects of constituency factors, such as percent of urban population in the district, percent of African American voters in the district, region of the country, and electoral margin of victory. Representatives elected from districts identified with big cities tend to be more liberal than those elected from districts with less urban perspectives (Bullock 1985; Whitby 1985); the positive effects of urbanization may be due to the presence of more liberal whites or the greater organizational efforts of urban blacks. This suggests that blacks elected from more urban districts ought to be relatively more cohesive with the CBC than their colleagues elected from less urban districts.

Not everyone agrees, however, that the percent African American voters in the district effects representatives' decisions (Combs, Hibbing, and Welch 1984; Bullock 1985; Fleisher 1993; Swain 1993; Whitby 1985). "There is clearly no consistent pattern for district racial composition and roll-call voting" (Bullock 1985: 802). What would we expect in terms of the internal unity of the Black Caucus? The creation of majority-minority districts to elect more African American politicians to represent black voters (Thernstrom 1987; Walters 1992; Shaw v. Reno 1993) suggests an expectation of a positive relationship between percent black voters in the district and the internal unity of the Caucus. Of potential applicability is Swain's (1993) argument that African American legislators in racially

and ethnically diverse districts are more likely to adopt deracializing strategies for election and reelection than their counterparts elected from districts with a primary constituency of black voters. Given the CBC's self-proclaimed role as the spokesperson for black voters (either nationally, in the district, or both), members elected from heterogeneous districts ought to be less cohesive with the Caucus on roll-call votes than their counterparts elected from more homogeneous districts.

Likewise, population diversity within regions might have an impact on CBC cohesion. Districts in Western states tend to have significantly more Latino voters than districts in other regions of the country. For example, among districts represented by black legislators, in 1993, Western states averaged 33 percent Latino constituents versus 16 percent, 4 percent, and 5 percent in Eastern, Midwestern, and Southern states respectively.<sup>12</sup> Thus representatives elected from districts in these latter regions ought to be more cohesive with the Caucus on roll-call votes than representatives elected from districts in the former region.

Finally, roll-call votes stand out easily and can be seized upon by challengers in reelection campaigns (Kingdon 1989; Mayhew 1974; Schiller 1995). Challengers seek opportunities to put incumbents on the defensive as a result of a package of legislative behavior portrayed as being out of touch with constituency preferences. The political costs of concrete examples of representatives' works influence their decision calculus "depending on constituency preferences and legislators' corresponding induced preferences" roll-call voting "may be either costly or beneficial" in terms of the electoral well-being of members (Krehbeil 1995: 909). Representatives' electoral margin may affect their legislative activities.

Thus the basic equation for addressing the question of what factors significantly affect Black Caucus members' adherence to group preferences with regard to roll-call voting cohesion will be of the following type:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CBC cohesion} = & b_0 + b_1 (\text{seniority}) + b_2 (\text{correspondence}) \\ & + b_3 (\text{Democratic presidential support scores}) \\ & + b_4 (\text{Republican presidential support scores}) \\ & + b_5 (\text{percent urbanization}) + b_6 (\text{percent black}) \\ & + b_7 (\text{region}) + b_8 (\text{margin}) + \text{error} \end{aligned}$$

---

<sup>12</sup> New York State's 15th congressional district is the exception. Latinos make up a large plurality of this district, 46 percent. In large part because of low Latino voter participation rates, non-Latino blacks, who make up about 37 percent of the district, continue to have the political upper hand (*Politics in America* 1994: 1063). An ANOVA confirms that the differences in the percentages of Latinos between regions is indeed significant [ $F(3,36) = 12.78, p < .01$ ].

<sup>13</sup> CBC cohesion is measured as the standard deviation of adjusted ADA scores for CBC members by year. Greater values indicate higher levels of dispersion (less unity), while lower values reflect greater cohesion.

where: CBC cohesion = roll-call vote cohesion<sup>13</sup>; seniority = years of service in House of Representatives<sup>14</sup>; correspondence = correspondence between the President's party and the CBC<sup>15</sup>; Democratic presidential support scores = CBC members voting in support of Democratic Presidents' declared policy positions<sup>16</sup>; Republican presidential support scores = CBC members voting in support of Republican Presidents' declared policy positions<sup>17</sup>; percent urbanization = percent district urbanization<sup>18</sup>; percent black = percent African American voters in the district<sup>19</sup>; region = east, midwest, south, and west<sup>20</sup>; and margin = electoral margin of victory.<sup>21</sup>

We pool the CBC data from the period under investigation, resulting in 471 observations for 57 CBC members serving an average of 7.87 years. Estimation

---

<sup>14</sup> Seniority is measured with two binary variables. The first variable is labeled junior and is coded 1 for all CBC members in their first or second term, and 0 otherwise. The second variable is labeled middle and is coded 1 for all CBC members in their third or fourth term, and 0 otherwise. Senior CBC members (i.e., those in their fifth term or higher) serve as the baseline group. The concept for this variable is borrowed from Schiller 1995.

<sup>15</sup> When the president's party and the CBC are the same, the variable has a value of 1; when they are different, it has a value of 0.

<sup>16</sup> Presidential support scores indicate whether individual representatives voted "yea" or "nay" in agreement with the president's declared policy positions. Presidential support scores are the standard measure obtained from *Congressional Quarterly*. The score is determined from the position of the president at the time of the vote. The president's position is calculated from presidential messages to Congress, news conferences, remarks and other public statements and documents. Support scores range from 0, indicating complete lack of support on all scoring votes, to 100, suggesting full agreement with the president's position. Democratic support scores only reflect CBC member's votes in support of Democratic presidents.

<sup>17</sup> The variable only reflects CBC member's votes in support of Republican presidents.

<sup>18</sup> The variable percent urbanization is measured as the percent of the districts population living in a metropolitan area with a population density of 1,000 persons or more per square mile (*Congressional Districts in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s*).

<sup>19</sup> The variable percent black is measured as a binary variable. It is scored 1 for black legislators elected from districts with 65 percent or more African American voters and 0 for those elected from districts with less than 65 percent African American voters in the constituency (*Almanac of American Politics, 1970-1988 and Politics in America, 1990-1994*). This threshold percentage is based on conventional wisdom that defines majority-minority political units as 65 percent black or more (Swain 1992; Bullock 1992). This coding scheme is also justified empirically. The percent black variable is coded as a dummy variable to reduce collinearity problems with the margin of victory variable (see note 22). The Pearson (r) correlation between these two variables is .49,  $p < 0.01$ ; however, when the variables are coded as dummy variables correlation diagnostics indicate no problem of multicollinearity. The Pearson (r) correlation between the variables is .20. It is logical that African American representatives elected from districts with higher percentages of black voters would have a greater margin of victory than those representatives elected from districts with less black voters.

<sup>20</sup> See note 7 for a breakdown of regions by states. The Eastern region serves as the baseline group.

<sup>21</sup> The variable margin is measured as the member's vote share in the last election and is scored 1 for 60 percent or more of the district vote and 0 for less than 60 percent of the district vote. It seems clear that, with little exception, we can define safe incumbents as those winning 60 percent or more of the two-party vote (Kazee 1994).

of the above equation, using a (grouped) pooled time-series cross-sectional model controls for within group and across time autocorrelations. The approach decomposes the error term ( $v_{it}$ ) into two components: a canonical independent and identically distributed disturbance ( $e_{it}$ ) and member effect or unit effect ( $u_i$ ; where  $v_{it} = u_i + e_{it}$ ). We use the random effects, generalized least squares approach as described by Hsiao (1986) to estimate parameters and control for unit effects.

We now turn to consideration of the effects of the independent variables on CBC cohesion.<sup>22</sup> The results are presented in Table 2. Seniority is associated with Caucus cohesion on roll-call votes. When all other variables are set to their mean values, juniors (i.e., black representatives in their first or second term) are over 20 percent more cohesive than their senior counterparts (i.e., those in their fifth term or more). However, the middle seniority-based category (i.e., black representatives in their third or fourth term) fails to achieve significance. In our discussion of the impact of House reference groups on CBC roll-call votes, we indicated that black legislators in general accepted more voting cues from the Black Caucus than either regional or state party delegations. This pattern of response to voting prevailed for all seniority-based categories (results not shown).

The variable for correspondence between the President's party and the CBC suggests that cohesion within the Caucus increases when the President is from the opposition party. For example, holding all variables to their means, the CBC is 61 percent (2.41 versus 6.18) more cohesive under Republican Presidents than under Democratic Presidents. In addition, the variables for presidential support are important predictors of voting cohesion within the CBC. African American representatives' support for Democratic or Republican Presidents has a significant impact on CBC cohesion. When all other variables are set to their mean values, a change of 5 percentage points from the mean presidential support score for Democratic Presidents (42.15) is typically associated with a 8.6 percent change in Caucus cohesion. A change of 5 percentage points from the mean presidential support score for Republican Presidents (14.6) is typically associated with a 18.9 percent change in Caucus cohesion.

Percent district urbanization had no effect on CBC cohesion.<sup>23</sup> However, percent African American voters in the district and region are associated with

---

<sup>22</sup> We also estimated the model employing a dichotomous variable to test for the effect of redistricting on CBC cohesion. The variable is coded 1 for district reapportionment and 0 otherwise. The coefficient for the redistricting variable failed to achieve significance and thus was excluded from the analysis.

<sup>23</sup> There is little correlation between percent district urbanization and percent African American voters in the district. Correlation diagnostics indicate no problem of multicollinearity. Pearson ( $r$ ) correlation between the variables is .027. Another possible concern with the percent urbanization variable is that there is little variation in district scores prior to the 1990s. The model was estimated for the years 1990-96 only. The results were of the same magnitude and direction (results not reported).

TABLE 2  
COHESION WITHIN THE CBC AND SOURCES OF VARIATION

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Seniority		
Junior	-.473 *	.238
Middle	-.189	.226
Correspondence	7.056 **	.951
Democratic Presidential Support Scores	-.079 **	.012
Republican Presidential Support Scores	.112 **	.018
Percent Urbanization	-.011	.008
Percent Black	-.389 *	.201
Region		
South	.379	.311
West	.846 **	.302
Midwest	.319	.260
Margin of Victory	-.597 *	.304
Constant	2.511	.990

R<sup>2</sup> within = 0.156, between = 0.323, overall = 0.173

chi<sup>2</sup> (10) = 88.90\*\*

+ = p < .1, \* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01

Estimates obtained from STATA 5.0

Caucus cohesion on roll-call votes. Black representatives elected from districts with greater than 65 percent African American voters tend to be over 16 percent more cohesive with the Black Caucus than their counterparts elected from districts with less than 65 percent of black voters. Black representatives elected from Western states are significantly less cohesive than their counterparts in Eastern states (i.e., baseline group); Southern and Midwestern states are not significantly different from the baseline region. This finding is consistent with the view that patterns within regions concerning Latino population in the district may impact differences between representatives' votes (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1996).

Finally, the variable for electoral margin is associated with Caucus cohesion. Findings suggest that black legislators who had a margin of victory 60 percent or greater in their last election are 29 percent more cohesive with the Black Caucus than their colleagues elected from less secure districts.

#### CONCLUSION

This study has shown that while African American representatives are not always cohesive, they are more cohesive with the CBC on roll-call behavior than they are with either their regional or state party delegations. Interestingly, the CBC's increased membership and diversity has not changed the overall voting homogeneity of the lot. Although seniority attenuates cohesion within the

Caucus, this pattern of response to voting cues prevailed for seniority-based categories. In addition, analysis of overall increases in partisanship in both the Republican and Democratic parties in the House and the coalitional basis of the Democratic party suggest that findings of CBC unity are real and not mere artifacts of party composition or party voting patterns.

While the challenge presented by institutional socialization (seniority) may contribute to modifying the voting behavior of black representatives, the evidence that the efficacy of the Black Caucus has been reduced by developments in the electoral arena is mixed. Percent black voters in the district and margin of victory in the district are significantly related to voting cohesion within the CBC but percent urbanization in the district has no substantial impact on Caucus unity. Finally, the study found that the Caucus's roll-call vote cohesion responds to the party of the President and presidential policy preferences. The Black Caucus is more likely to act as a cohesive body when the President and the CBC do not share the same party and presidential policy initiatives are perceived by black legislators as conflicting with or threatening the interests of black voters.

Aside from dovetailing nicely with the roll-call voting literature, this study underscores the connections between electing minority representatives and the policy consequences of increased minority voices in Congress. For example, the results of our statistical analysis of the link between district racial composition and CBC ideological cohesion suggest that when the black population in the district is greater, black representatives cast more liberal roll-call votes and thus are more responsive to black interests (for a discussion on the topic of race and ideology see Lublin 1997). The creation of majority-minority districts to advance minority representation may indeed have positive implications for the future of black descriptive and substantive representation. Suffice it to say, when the CBC is cohesive on roll-call votes, it has a pivotal impact on public policy issues of concern to African Americans (Canon 1995) and thus can be used as a vehicle for promoting policy changes (Cunningham 1993) within the Democratic caucus and the House more generally.

Initial signs suggest that the CBC has sustained its ideological unity notwithstanding the Republicans take over of Congress. Determining whether the CBC provides African Americans an instrument to wield power in Congress, however, is far more complicated than showing how and when group ideological cohesion varies. Considering that Republicans presently constitute a majority in Congress, attempts to exclude black Republicans from caucus meetings (such as Gary Franks and J. C. Watts, the only black Republicans during our period of study) cuts to the heart of the question of representation for blacks in Congress and whether the CBC is detrimental because it is so tightly aligned with the Democratic party. Subsequent research to ascertain the impact of these relevant issues on the aggregate responsiveness of the House of Representatives to black interests is in order.

Lastly, a broader examination of cohesion in congressional caucuses is necessary to see, at least with respect to their cohesiveness on the floor, how significant the various informal caucuses are. In addition, analyses comparing cohesion of informal caucuses, such as the CBC, to that of other groups in the House may differentiate the effect of coalescing bonds on caucus solidarity.

#### REFERENCES

- Baker, L., and J. McCorry. 1976. *Black Americans and the Political System*. Cambridge: Winthrop.
- Barnett, Marguerite Ross. 1975. "The Congressional Black Caucus." *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 32: 34-50.
- Barone, Michael, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Matthews. 1970. *Almanac of American Politics 1970*. Boston: Gambit, Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1972. *Almanac of American Politics, 1972*. Boston: Gambit, Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1973. *Almanac of American Politics, 1974*. Boston: Gambit, Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975. *Almanac of American Politics, 1976*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1977. *Almanac of American Politics, 1978*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1979. *Almanac of American Politics, 1980*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1981. *Almanac of American Politics, 1982*. Washington, DC: Barone.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1983. *Almanac of American Politics 1984*. Washington, DC: National Journal.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1986. *Almanac of American Politics, 1986*. Washington, DC: National Journal.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988. *Almanac of American Politics, 1988*. Washington, DC: National Journal.
- Bass, Jack, and Walter DeVries. 1977. *The Transformation of Southern Politics*. New York: Basic Books.
- Black, Earl, and Merle Black. 1987. *Politics and Society in the South*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Blanpied, Nancy A., Calvin Chin, Patricia M. Russotto, and Mark White. 1983. In Martha V. Gottron, ed., *Congressional Districts in the 1980s*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
- Bullock, Charles. 1985. "Congressional Roll Call Voting in a Two-Party South." *Social Science Quarterly* 66: 789-804.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1992. "Minorities in State Legislatures." In Gary F. Moncrief and Joel A. Thompson, eds., *Changing Patterns in State Legislative Careers*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Canon, David T. 1995. "Redistricting and the Congressional Black Caucus." *American Politics Quarterly* 23: 159-89.
- Champagne, Richard A., and Leroy N. Rieselbach. 1995. "The Evolving Congressional Black Caucus: The Reagan-Bush Years." In H. L. Perry and Wayne Parent, eds., *Blacks and the American Political System*, pp. 130-61. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

- Clapp, C. L. 1963. *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Combs, Michael W., John R. Hibbing, and Susan Welch. 1984. "Black Constituents and Congressional Roll Call Votes." *Western Political Quarterly* 37: 427-34.
- Congressional Quarterly Staff. 1989. In Phil Ducan, ed., *Politics in America: The 101st Congress, 1990*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991. In Phil Ducan, ed., *Politics in America: The 102nd Congress, 1992*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1993. In Phil Ducan, ed., *Politics in America: The 103rd Congress, 1994*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1993. In Jon Preimesberger and David Tarr, eds., *Congressional Districts in the 1990s*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
- Cover, Albert D., Neil Pinney, and George Serra. 1997. "Voting Behavior in the U.S. House and Senate: Regional Shifts and Contemporary Changes in Party Coalitions." *Party Politics* 3: 221-41.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cunningham, Kitty. 1993. "Black Caucus Flexes Muscles on Budget and More." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, July 3, 1711-15.
- Davidson Roger, and Walter Oleszek. 1990. *Congress and Its Members*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Deckard, Barbara. 1972. "State Party Delegations in the U.S. House of Representatives: A Comparative Study of Group Cohesion." *Journal of Politics* 34: 199-222.
- Ferber, M. F. 1971. "The Formation of the Democratic Study Group." In Nelson Polsby, ed., *Congressional Behavior*, pp. 249-69. New York: Random House.
- Fiellin, A. 1962. "The Function of Informal Groups in Legislative Institutions." *Journal of Politics* 24: 75-90.
- Fleisher, Richard J. 1993. "Explaining the Change in Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Southern Democrats." *Journal of Politics* 55: 327-41.
- Giles, Roxanne, and Charles Jones. 1995. "Congressional Racial Solidarity Exploring Congressional Black Caucus Voting Cohesion, 1971-1990." *Journal of Black Studies* 25: 622-41.
- Groennings, S. 1973. "The Clubs in Congress: The House Wednesday Group." In S. Groennings and J. P. Hawley, eds., *To Be a Congressman: The Promise and the Power*, pp. 73-98. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Groseclose, Timothy, Steve Levitt, and James Snyder. 1995. "An Inflation-Adjusted ADA Measure." Typescript. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T.
- Hammond, Susan. 1989. "Congressional Caucuses in the Policy Process." In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 4th ed., pp. 351-71. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

- Hammond, Susan, A. G. Stevens, and D. P. Mulhollan. 1983. "Congressional Caucuses: Legislators as Lobbyists." In A. J. Cigler and B. A. Loomis, eds., *Interest Group Politics*, pp. 275-97. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Harris, Douglas B. 1994. "On Symbolic and Material Caucus Power: The Congressional Black Caucus, 92nd-103rd Congresses." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-4, New York.
- Henry, Charles P. 1977. "Legitimizing Race in Congressional Politics." *American Politics Quarterly* 5: 149-76.
- Hero, Rodney, and Caroline Tolbert. 1996. "A Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the U.S." *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 851-71.
- Howell, David C. 1982. *Statistical Methods for Psychology*. Boston: Duxbury Press.
- Hsiao, Cheng. 1986. *Analysis of Panel Data*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kau, James B., and Paul Rubin. 1982. *Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors: Determinants of Roll-Call Voting in the House of Representatives*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Kazee, Thomas A. 1994. "The Emergence of Congressional Candidates." In Thomas A. Kazee, ed., *Who Runs for Congress? Ambition, Context, and Candidate Emergence*, pp. 1-22. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.
- Kingdon, John. 1989. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, 3rd ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23: 235-66.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1994. "Difference, Extremism, and Interest Group Ratings." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19: 61-77.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1995. "Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z." *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 906-23.
- Levy, Arthur B., and Susan Stoudinger. 1976. "Sources of Voting Cues for the Congressional Black Caucus." *Journal of Black Studies* 7: 29-45.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1978. "The Black Caucus in the 92nd Congress: Gauging Its Success." *Phylon* 38: 322-32.
- Loomis, Burdett A. 1981. "Congressional Caucuses and the Politics of Representation." In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, pp. 204-20. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Masters, N. A. 1961. "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 55: 345-47.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Neustadt, Richard E. 1980. *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter*. New York: Wiley.
- Patterson, Samuel C., and Gregory A. Calderia. 1988. "Party Voting in the United States Congress." *British Journal of Political Science* 18: 111-31.
- Poole, Keith T. 1981. "Dimensions of Interest Group Evaluations of the U.S. Senate, 1969-1978." *Journal of Politics* 25: 49-67.
- Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll-Call Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 357-84.
- Rhode, David W. 1989. "Something's Happening Here: What It Is Ain't Exactly Clear: Southern Democrats in the House of Representatives." In Morris P. Fiorina and David W. Rohde, eds., *Home Style and Washington Work: Studies of Congressional Politics*, pp. 137-63. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schiller, Wendy. 1995. "Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas." *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 186-203.
- Scholz, John T., and F. H. Wei. 1986. "Regulatory Enforcement in a Federal System." *American Journal of Political Science* 80: 1249-70.
- Shaw v. Reno*. 1993. 113 S.Ct. 2816.
- Singh, Robert. 1998. *Congressional Black Caucus: Racial Politics in the U.S. Congress*. London: Sage Publications.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 1982. *Congressional Realignment: 1925-1978*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Snyder, James M. 1991. "On Buying Legislatures." *Economics and Politics* 3: 93-109.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1992. "Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17: 319-45.
- Stanely, Harold, and Richard Niemi. 1994. *Vital Statistics on American Politics*, 4th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Stevens, A. G., A. H. Miller, and T. T. Mann. 1974. "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955-1970: The Democratic Study Group." *American Political Science Review* 68: 667-81.
- Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert Erikson. 1994. "Opinion and Policy: A Global View." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27: 29-34.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1995. "Dynamic Representation." *American Political Science Review* 89: 543-65.
- Swain, Carol M. 1992. "Some Consequences of the Voting Rights Act." In Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, eds., *Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective*, pp. 292-296. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1993. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African-Americans in Congress*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Thernstrom, Abigail. 1987. *Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Walters, Ronald. 1992. "Two Political Traditions: Black politics in the 1990s." *National Political Science Review* 3: 198-207.
- Warden, Moxley, and Wayne Walker. 1973. In Robert A. Diamond, ed., *Congressional Districts in the 1970s*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
- Weingast, B. R. and M. J. Moran. 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission." *Journal of Political Economy* 91: 965-80.
- Welch, Susan, and John Hibbing. 1984. "Hispanic Representation in the United States Congress." *Social Science Quarterly* 65: 328-35.
- Whitby, Kenny J. 1985. "Effects of the Interaction between Race and Urbanization on Votes of Southern Congressmen." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 10: 505-17.
- Wolman, Harold., and Norman Thomas. 1970. "Black Interests, Black Groups, and Black Influence in the Federal Policy Process: The Cases of Housing and Education." *Journal of Politics* 32: 875-97.

---

Received: February 18, 1998  
Accepted: February 12, 1999  
pinney@wmich.edu  
gserra@topcat.bridgew.edu

---